

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.266  
21 June 1966  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 21 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

NOV 18 1966

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

(Poland)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

Mr. G.O. OJO

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. 'ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV  
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN  
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN  
Mr. J.E.D. STREET

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. C.G. BREAM  
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the 266th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The Bulgarian delegation would first of all like to state that it associates itself with all the representatives who have welcomed to our Committee the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira. We too wish him every success in fulfilling his important assignment.

During the discussions which took place in the Committee before the recess a number of interesting proposals were put forward, the positions of individual delegations on various questions of disarmament were defined even more precisely, and the disagreements between them were also revealed more clearly. The material thus accumulated is more than sufficient to allow us to draw conclusions which enable us, after the recess, to reply correctly to the question why the Eighteen-Nation Committee has so far made no progress towards agreement on the problems of disarmament entrusted to it. These correct conclusions would allow us to examine closely once more the real reasons for the unsatisfactory results of our work, and would oblige us to make every effort to enable the Committee to move out of its impasse in regard to the problems before it.

The Bulgarian delegation, like most of the previous speakers, considers that we should not go to the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly empty-handed. At present we would prefer not to argue but to apply ourselves to rendering more precise the final wording of the draft international agreements to which we came very close in the course of the discussions, such as, for example, an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. But what can we do when at the very beginning of the present session we hear from the representative of the United States declarations which move the Committee further away from any possible solution? In fact, all the peoples of the world expect from the United States an end to its aggression against the people of Viet-Nam, but attempts are being made here to justify the war of extermination against that people by declaring it an aggressor against itself.

Moreover, when the socialist delegations refer to the peace-endangering actions of the United States in South East Asia, this is called propaganda, as if it were not a fact that Viet-Nameese children, women and old men are being killed every day

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and their material culture destroyed simply because they do not want rulers like General Ky! But that the events in Viet-Nam have a direct bearing on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee even the United Kingdom delegation does not doubt, as is evident from Lord Chalfont's recent remarks (ENDC/PV.265, p. 5 ).

The fact of the continuing and expanding United States aggression in South-East Asia against the people of Viet-Nam, against the sovereign Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, merely confirms the idea expressed here that the Government which is carrying out armed intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and is continually intensifying the arms race and international tension, is of course not interested in disarmament. By pursuing a policy directly opposed to the aims and tasks of our Committee, the United States Government is blocking in the Eighteen-Nation Committee any progress, however slight, towards a reduction of tension in international relations or towards the adoption of effective collateral measures of disarmament, disregarding the fact that the majority of the delegations are prepared to take such steps towards disarmament.

The peoples of the world wish to live in peace. They are, for example, against military bases and foreign troops that constantly interfere in their internal affairs and threaten their independence. The most recent examples of such interference are the provocations and hostile actions deliberately carried out by the United States of America against the independent State of Cuba, taking advantage of the United States base at Guantanamo which is situated on Cuban territory. There are so far no signs that the United States intends to reduce the tension which it has itself brought about in that part and other parts of the world.

Meanwhile, the peoples of the world ardently desire and demand in the first place the elimination of the nuclear menace as the most important task on the way to the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. This goal, however, cannot be attained by limited measures or by singing the praises of the "Baruch Plan" (AEC/PV.1, pp.45 et seq.), which was conceived, as is well known, for the purpose of preserving the nuclear monopoly of the United States, and which in its detailed form provided for the establishment of a body invested with considerable rights of intervention in the internal affairs of States. When we heard Mr. Foster remind us of the bankrupt "Baruch Plan", we wondered whether it was a matter of chance that this was done at the beginning of our session, from which everyone has a right to expect at least a decision to prevent extension of the nuclear menace.

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We think that in this case there is once again revealed the desire of the United States of America, as at the time of the Baruch proposals, to secure unilateral advantages. It was and is possible to eliminate the nuclear menace by means of the much more effective measures which were originally proposed by the Soviet Government and which remain on the agenda of the Committee to this day, such as the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons accumulated by States; the prohibition of their production; the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their manufacture (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1). But the United States and its Western Allies, not wishing to give up the means of nuclear blackmail, are still not prepared to agree to even more limited measures, such as the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe -- one of the most dangerous and sensitive areas of the world. Yet such constructive proposals exist. The Committee has before it, for example, the proposals of the People's Republic of Poland (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6) and the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/151, 168), which have a direct bearing on the reduction of tension and the ensuring of security in Europe.

The Bulgarian delegation, bearing in mind the real causes of the deadlock in the work of the Committee, urges their removal and is prepared to make renewed efforts for the achievement of success in our work. It seems to us particularly necessary to reach an agreement on those urgent problems which were entrusted to the Committee by the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (ENDC/161). I refer to the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of prohibiting underground tests of such weapons, without neglecting our basic task -- the problem of general and complete disarmament.

It is unnecessary to stress the need for the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have already had an opportunity to express our point of view (ENDC/PV.261). We are in favour of a treaty which would close all loop-holes and prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly, in any form. We believe that in this regard it is possible already, at the present time rather than in the distant future, for the treaty to be completely comprehensive and in accordance with the contents of resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This is why we are convinced that it is the Soviet draft (ENDC/164) that should be taken as the

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basis of such a treaty. Limited non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as provided for in the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1), cannot and should not satisfy anyone. That draft is contrary to resolution 2028 (XX) and fails to meet the most essential requirement: the closing of all loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the debates which have taken place up to now we have pointed out in detail the shortcomings of the amended United States draft. At present I intend to deal only with the following.

We have been told here that the United States delegation, by introducing amendments into its original text, has improved it and that the time has come for the Soviet delegation to amend its text. We cannot fail to note this rather odd confusion. In the first place, none of the Western countries in the Committee has indicated justifiably what is lacking in the Soviet draft and what should be added or amended from the point of view of its basic principles. On the contrary, the majority of delegations have approved the principles underlying the articles of the draft. Secondly, the United States amendments (ENDC/152/Add.1) have introduced no substantive changes into the original draft, and its basic concept -- limited non-proliferation -- has been retained in its entirety. Moreover, it has become clearer and thus its shortcomings in regard to restriction have been revealed more distinctly.

As long as the word "control" was not interpreted in the original text, it might have been assumed that a wide, comprehensive control was implied. In the amendments, however, article IV (c) gives a more precise interpretation of the concept of "control" in the sense that it simply means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons independently.

Thus the Western delegations are suggesting that we adopt a treaty which ensures in advance the possibility for non-nuclear States of participating indirectly in the ownership and use of nuclear weapons, both within the framework of military alliances and outside such alliances by means of bilateral agreements with any nuclear State. The same possibilities for the spread of nuclear weapons would be provided by all other existing military agreements involving States possessing nuclear weapons, and also by all future agreements involving nuclear and non-nuclear States. In this respect we maintain the opinion that the amendments of the United States are rather a step backwards.

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In our statements we have constantly emphasized the obvious inconsistency between the contents of resolution 2028 (XX) and the proposals of the Western delegations. We cannot get away from the impression that the Western delegations are not at all willing to conclude a treaty closing all loop-holes which human perspicacity could foresee at the present stage. We cannot explain otherwise the remarks made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at our meeting of 10 April:

"It would be tragic if we failed to close the door to proliferation in time because we had kept ourselves busy with an abstract argument about the number of loop-holes that might be imagined in this or that treaty clause." (ENDC/PV.263, p.16)

At our meeting of 14 June Mr. Foster said:

"... the alternative to prevention of nuclear spread is not a world with one or two new nuclear-weapon States in, say, five years, but rather a world with perhaps ten new nuclear-weapon States in ten to twenty years from now." (ENDC/PV.264, p.11)

If we were to follow that approach in drafting a treaty, it would mean that it would be enough for us to be content with some sort of formal treaty in which loop-holes remained for increasing the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. That approach would lead to our abandoning the basic principles of the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. But a treaty of that kind could satisfy only those States which wish to ensure in advance for themselves freedom of action in regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by hiding behind the screen of a formal treaty. We repeat that we are in favour of concluding an effective treaty because, as we see it, only such a treaty would settle the questions "of the immediate and distant future" and would take into account the "current" and "global" aspects of the nuclear threat.

The delegations of the socialist countries have quite rightly pointed out in the Committee that the United States is seeking to retain this freedom of action for itself and to provide one or two -- or possibly even more -- of its allies with nuclear weapons. One of these allies, the Federal Republic of Germany, is insistently demanding the right to participate in the ownership and disposal of nuclear weapons. The United States is evidently not able to give a refusal to this ally, and in this Committee, disregarding the interests of other States, it is doing its utmost to



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leave in the agreement at least a half-open door for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is clear in these circumstances why no progress is being made in the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The socialist countries have other serious reasons for not agreeing with this approach of the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only European country which, in violation of the Potsdam Agreements and with the connivance of its principal allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, is openly pursuing a policy of accelerated rearmament, revanchism and the revision of frontiers, thus throwing down a challenge to the United Nations, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to all mankind. While we are concerned here with the elimination of the nuclear menace and the search for ways to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, Mr. von Hassel, Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, states:

"According to our understanding, joint physical ownership means that there will be established for NATO a common system of armaments which will be financed jointly and under joint responsibility and will be under the joint ownership of NATO, and that there will be joint agreement in regard to its main trend." (Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 March 1966)

We believe that there is no need for further quotations, especially after what Mr. Foster has quoted to us (ENDC/PV.264, p.24), for it turns out that none other than the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany himself has said that he is content to share United States "control" of nuclear weapons and that therefore he does not need his own national control. How else is one to understand the words of the Chancellor quoted by Mr. Foster? Statements of that sort by West German politicians and statesmen are not infrequent. In that case how can the United States' right of "veto" and the renunciation by the Federal Republic of Germany of "national control" have any decisive significance?

It is not difficult to realize how easily joint ownership can turn into individual ownership. In regard to the purpose for which the West German leaders dream of obtaining nuclear weapons, they themselves very often make it quite clear, as Minister Seehofer has done once again a few days ago. I would ask the Western representatives not to lose their tempers and not to "refute" us without adducing any proof when we speak about revanchism in the foreign policy of Bonn, but, before

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it is too late, to draw the conclusion that it is inadmissible to allow access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever to those who on Saturday, 18 June, were vociferating at Munich about "the right of Sudeten Germans to their Fatherland".

In conclusion, it seems to me that what we should do now is not to count up how many formal amendments have been made by one or another delegation but to reach agreement on the main issue: compliance with the basic principles of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is here that the most substantial differences have in fact appeared. To reconcile and overcome these differences an exchange of formal amendments will not suffice; what is needed is a constructive approach by the Western delegations, which means concretely the renunciation of egotistic, group formulations of questions.

So far as the Bulgarian delegation is concerned, it will continue to strive for agreement on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on other questions of disarmament with which the Committee is dealing, bearing in mind the interests of peace and of all States, and not those of individual groups of States.

Mr. TAHOURDIN (United Kingdom): I have asked for the floor in order to make a short statement, which I hope will be of interest.

Members of this Committee may recall that last June Lord Chalfont announced in the House of Lords that Her Majesty's Government had, in pursuance of its general policy of helping to develop the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, decided to place the civil nuclear power station at Bradwell in Essex under safeguards. An agreement to bring that about was signed yesterday in Vienna with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The station, which is run by the United Kingdom Central Electricity Generating Board, will be the largest nuclear installation of its kind in the world so far to be submitted to the international safeguard system. It has an output of 1,100 megawatts thermal.

My delegation believes that this arrangement marks a significant step towards increasing the scope and effectiveness of the system of safeguards, which is a guarantee against the diversion to military ends of materials intended for the civil nuclear programme. I am sure that all the delegations here will agree with the view of my Government that it thus has an important part to play in helping to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

As the Committee will be aware, the United States has already placed a number of reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, including the "Yankee" atomic station in Massachusetts. We hope that other countries will follow suit.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I want to welcome the announcement made by the representative of the United Kingdom concerning the placing of that important facility under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to express the hope -- as we have done in the past here -- that the example will be followed by many others; since we in the United States believe strongly that such acceptance of safeguards with regard to peaceful activities in the nuclear field will be of great value to the whole world in ensuring the safety of the products of such facilities.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): In accordance with the arrangements decided on at the meeting of 14 June (ENDC/PV.264, p.25), the next meeting will be devoted to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 266th meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. M. Blusztajn, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 June, 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.5 a.m.

